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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Bradley D. Green appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Officer Garth Davis of the Hailey Police Department observed Green
driving 38 mph in a 25 mph zone. (Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.2; p.11, L.21 - p.13,
L.2.)

After stopping Green for speeding, Officer Davis noticed that Green

smelled like alcohol, slurred his speech, and had glassy and bloodshot eyes.

Officer Davis asked Green to exit his vehicle and perform standard field
sobriety tests. (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-24.) Green however, refused to perform the
tests and demanded that his attorney be present. (Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.20, L.14.)
Officer Davis told Green that he was not entitled to consult counsel at that time.
(Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) Officer Davis then arrested Green for DUI.'

(Tr., p.21,

Ls.5-12.)
Officer Davis transported Green to the intoxilyzer room of the Blaine
County Jail. (Tr., p.21, L.20 - p.22, L.7.) Green refused to submit to the breath
test. (Tr., p.24, L.21

- p.25,

L.15.) Officer Davis then filled out an affidavit in

support of a a warrant to draw Green's blood, which was transported to and
signed by a judge. (Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16; p.27, Ls.13-16.)

In the interim, Green

The relevant citation indicated that Officer Davis arrested Green for "DUI
Refusal" pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(3). (R., p.4.) However, Officer Davis
testified that he arrested Green for "DUI", and Green ultimately pled guilty to
driving under the influence, in violation of I.C. § 18-8004. (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-12; R.,
pp.55-63.) The magistrate court found that Officer Davis arrested Green
"ostensibly for refusing to submit to evidentiary tests." (R., p.43.)

continued to request that he be permitted to consult his lawyer, but was not
permitted to do so. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-12.)
Green was transported to a hospital where his blood was drawn. (Tr.,
p.27, L.13 - p.29, L.13.) He was then transported back to the Blaine County Jail,
where he was booked, a process that was delayed by Green's lack of
cooperation. (Tr., p.29, L.19 - p.30, L.6.) Green bonded out from jail at 4:40 am,
approximately one hour and ten minutes after the blood draw.' (Tr., p.30, Ls.1113; p.36, Ls.7-22.)
Green filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by Officer Green
during the investigation, arguing that he was denied his right to consult with
counsel during the attempted administration of the field sobriety tests, and after
he was arrested, up until when he bonded out.

(R., pp.17-19.)

After a

suppression hearing, the magistrate court denied the motion. (R., pp.36-38; 4348.)

Green entered a conditional guilty plea to DUI. (R., pp.55-63.)

In its

appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the magistrate court's denial of
Green's motion to suppress. ( R . p.111) Green filed a timely appeal. (R.,
pp.113-116.)

'

The record does not indicate the results of the blood test, or whether the blood
was actually tested.

ISSUE
Green states the issues on appeal as:
A:

WERE GREEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED
WHEN HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO COMMUNICATE
WITH AN ATTORNEY DURING THE INITIAL STOP BUT
MORE IMPORTANTLY AFTER THE EVlDENTlARY
PROCEDURE
FOR
ALCOHOL
TESTING
WAS
COMPLETED UP UNTIL HE WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL?

B:

DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN ITS REASONING WHEN
IT DENIED GREEN'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS?

C:

SHOULD GREEN'S BLOOD TEST
SUPPRESSED FROM EVIDENCE?

RESULTS

BE

(Appellant's brief, p.7 (emphasis and capitalization in original).)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Green failed to show that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to
suppress?

ARGUMENT
Green Has Failed To Show That The Maqistrate Court Erred In Denvina His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Green contends that the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to

s ~ p p r e s s .(&
~

generally, Appellant's brief.) He alleges that his due process

rights were violated when he was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel
to arrange alternative testing during the officer's attempted administration of the
field sobriety tests, and at all times after his arrest, excluding during the state's
attempted administration of the BAC breath test. (Id.)
Green's contention fails.

While the ldaho appellate courts have

recognized a statutory and due process right to contact an attorney in order to
facilitate a DUI suspect's gathering of evidence after his submission to the state's
evidentiary test, there is no statutory or due process right to contact an attorney
before submitting to an evidentiary test.

Green contends that all evidence and observations of Green's intoxication,
including the odor of alcohol coming from Green during the traffic stop and
Green's slurred speech, should be suppressed as a remedy for the alleged due
process violation. (Appellant's brief, p.21.) However, if this Court does
determine that Green's due process rights were violated, the only appropriate
remedy, consistent with State v. Carr, 128 ldaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App.
1995), is the suppression of the state's blood test results, not the officer's
observations that occurred prior to the alleged due process violation. id. at 185.
See also State v. Cantrell, 139 ldaho 409,411, 80 P.3d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 2003)
-("When a DUI detainee is denied additional testing by peace officers, the results
of the evidentiary testing done by the state are inadmissible.")

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 ldaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 ldaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

Id.

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] afFirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." @. (citing Losser, 145
ldaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 ldaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith,
141 ldaho 728, 729-730, 117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
ldaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).

C.

Green Did Not Have A Riqht To Consult With Counsel Prior To The
Blood Draw
"The right of a defendant charged with an alcohol-related driving offense

to obtain additional testing is derived from both statutory and constitutional
sources." State v. Hedqes, 143 ldaho 884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App.
2007).
Green cites I.C. Ij 18-8002, State v. Madden, 127 ldaho 894, 908 P.2d
587 (Ct. App. 1995). and State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App.
1995), for the proposition that he had a right to consult counsel at various times
prior to the blood draw.

(@

generallly Appellant's brief.)

None of these

authorities, however, extend this right to any time prior to when the DUI suspect
actually submits to a state-administered intoxication test.
ldaho Code § 18-8002(4)(e)~provides, in relevant part:
After submittina to evidentiarv testinq at the request of the
peace officer, [a DUI suspect] may, when practicable, at his own
expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own
choosing.
(emphasis added.)
The plain language of I.C. Ij 18-8002(4)(e) provides a statutory right to
procure additional tests, only

after

submitting to a peace officer's evidentiary

tests. A DUI suspect does not have a right, under I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), to
interrupt the state's investigation to pursue his own.

Prior to 2009, I.C. Ij 18-8002(4)(e) was codified as I.C. 18-8002(4)(d). The
state will refer to this statute as I.C. Ij 18-8002(4)(e), even when referencing its
application in appellate court opinions prior to 2009.

In State v. Madden, 127 ldaho 894, 908 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995), the
ldaho Court of Appeals held that from the I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e) statutory right to
procure additional testing and evidence after submitting to a peace officer's
evidentiary test, necessarily follows a DUI suspect's right to contact an attorney
to facilitate such testing and evidence gathering, even if the suspect is still in
custody.

Id.at 896.

In Madden, the DUI suspect submitted to the state's breath

test,5 then directly asserted her statutory right for an independent test and the
opportunity to communicate with her attorney to arrange it.

4. at 895.

requests were denied by the attending police officers for several hours.

These

Id. at

895-896. The ldaho Court of Appeals held that the state thus violated I.C. 3 188002(4)(e), and that the appropriate remedy was suppression of the state's BAC
test results. @. at 589-590.
In State v. Carr, 128 ldaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995), Carr
submitted to the state's breath test, and then requested to speak to a lawyer, but
did not specifically request the opportunity to arrange an independent BAC test.
Id. at
-

182-183. The ldaho Court of Appeals noted that because Carr, unlike

Madden, did not specifically assert her statutory right to an independent BAC
test, the "statutory issue is not squarely before us as it was in Madden."
183. However, the Court held that even when the I.C.

3

Id. at

18-8002(4)(e) right is

not directly asserted, a DUI suspect has a Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to consult with an attorney via telephone, upon request, after she submits to
a state evidentiary test, in order to obtain an independent test or otherwise obtain
Madden agreed to take a breath test, and blew a BAC of ,211. She refused to
blow a second time. Madden, 127 at 896,908 P.2d at 589.

a "fair opportunity to defend against the [sltate's accusations."

Id. at

183-184,

quoting Chambers v. Mississio~i,410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
The Court, however, continued to recognize that like the statutory right of
I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), the companion due process right applied only after a DUI
suspect actually submits to the peace officer's evidentiary test:
[Tlhe only opportunity for a defendant in a DUI case to
gather exculpatory evidence is within a reasonable time following
arrest and administration of the [sltate's BAC test. As a result,
when a person is arrested for DUI and aiven an evidentiarv BAC
test,that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone
call upon request to do so.
Carr, 128 ldaho at 184, 911 P.2d at 777 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Allowing an individual arrested for DUI to make a telephone
call once the lsltate administers its evidentiarv BAC test ensures
that the arrestee will be given the opportunity to obtain exculpatory
evidence.
Id. at 185. (emphasis added.) In State v. Shelton, 129 ldaho 877, 880, 934 P.2d
943, 946 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court of Appeals noted that the issue in Madden
and Carr was "the right to a second BAC test." (emphasis added.)
Green contends the statutory right of I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e) as recognized
by Madden, and the companion due process right illustrated in

Carr, expand

further, and that he had a right to consult with counsel during the officer's
attempted administration of the field sobriety tests, upon his arrival at the police
station after his arrest, and after he refused the state's BAC test. (See generally,
Appellant's brief.) This assertion is contrary to the plain language of I.C. § 188002(4)(e), and is not supported by
Green. Under I.C.

m,or any other authority presented by

9 18-8002(4)(e), the Fourteenth Amendment, Madden, and

Carr, the state is permitted to successfully administer an evidentiaiy test before
the DUI suspect's right to pursue an alternative test takes effect.
An argument similar to Green's was rejected by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. In State v. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 2003), Larivee, a DUI suspect,
refused to submit to the state's evidentiary test, and instead directly requested
that a person of his choosing be permitted to come to the jail to perform an
independent test.6

id. at 228.

The attending officer denied this request. @.

Larivee argued that the state thus violated his statutory and constitutional due
process right to an independent evidentiary test.

Id.at 228-229.

The Minnesota Supreme Court first endeavored to determine the extent of
Larivee's statutory right to his own independent test. @. at 229. Minn.Stat.

3

169.123, subd. 3(a) (2000),~which is similar to I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), states, in
relevant part:
The person tested has the right to have someone of the
person's own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in
addition to any administered at the direction of a peace officer;
provided, that the additional test sample on behalf of the person is
obtained at the place where the person is in custody, after the test
administered at the direction of a peace officer, and at no expense
to the state.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that because Larivee refused the
state's evidentiary test, he was not a "person tested" under the statute, and thus
Larivee was permitted to contact an attorney after he was read the Minnesota
Implied Consent Advisory. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d at 228. Minnesota law, unlike
Idaho law, allows a DUI suspect to consult with an attorney before making the
decision whether to submit to a chemical intoxication test. Com~areFriedman v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991) with I.C. $ 188002(2).

had no right to obtain an independent test. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d at 229. The
Minnesota Supreme Court also recognized that the statutory phrases "in
addition", "additional test", and "after the test administered," indicated that the
statute was intended to grant a statutory right only to those who have first
submitted to the police-administered test.

Id.

Similarly, I.C. 3 18-8002(4)(e) clearly intends, as illustrated by the phrases
"after submitting to evidentiary testing," and "additional tests," to grant a statutory
right only to those who have first submitted to the police-administeredtests.
The Minnesota Supreme Court next addressed the issue of whether
Larivee's constitutional due process rights were violated by the denial of his
request for an independent test. jcj. at 230. Applying California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479 (1984), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that because there was no evidence in the record that the
alcohol-concentration tests administered by the state were inaccurate, there were
no assurances that the independent test would be exculpatory, and therefore
Larivee had no due process right to an independent test. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d at
231-232.
As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Larivee, "many other
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have found no due process violation."
Id. at 232.
-

State v. Zoss, 360 N.W.2d 523, 524 (S.D. 1985) ("If [the DUI

suspect] had wanted possible exculpatory evidence, she could have consented
to the breath test which may have been exculpatory and still had a chance of
getting a possible exculpatory blood test. There is nothing fundamentally unfair

in this procedure, nor did it deny her a 'meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense."'); People v. Dewey, 431 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. App. 1988);
v. State, 494 S.E.2d. 229 (Ga. App. 1997) (holding that DUI suspect waived his
constitutional due process right to an additional BAC test by refusing to take
state's BAC test). But see State v. Swanson, 722 P.2d 1155 222 (Mont. 1986);
Smith v. Cada, 562 P.2d 390 (Ariz. App. 1977); State v. Choate, 667 S.W.2d 111
(Tenn. Crim. App.1983).
This Court should follow the jurisdictions which have found that a DUI
suspect does not have a constitutional due process right to refuse the state's
evidentiary test and then immediately arrange his own. It is not fundamentally
unfair to allow the state to successfully complete an evidentiary test before a DUI
suspect is permitted to begin his investigation. If, as stated by the ldaho Court of
Appeals in

m,this right to further investigation is rooted in a DUI suspect's

"interest in procuring evidence which would challenge the results of the [sltate's
BAC test"

(Wr,128 ldaho at

184), it makes no sense for this right to apply

before the state can actually successfully complete such a test.
ldaho Code § 18-8002A(2)(f) requires the state to inform a DUI suspect, at
the time of evidentiary testing, that "ialfler submitting to evidentiary testing you
may, when practicable, at your own expense, have additional tests made by a
person of your own choosing." (Emphasis added). If, as Green contends, a DUI
suspect also has the right to refuse the state's evidentiary test and then
immediately arrange his own, I.C. § 18-8002A(2) must be unconstitutionally

misleading, as it would fail to adequately inform, and would perhaps mislead, the
DUI suspect about the extent of his rights. Green has made no such contention.
Green makes the additional argument that incorrect information relayed by
the police officer to Green during the traffic stop somehow expanded his rights
under I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), Madden, and Gary. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5, 9.) The
arresting officer informed Green that he was not entitled to counsel during the
officer's attempted administration of the field sobriety tests because of Idaho's
implied consent statute. (Tr., p.18, L.18

- p.19, L.2.)

The officer also informed

Green that he was arresting him for refusing to submit to the field sobriety tests.
(Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.4.)
However, as the district court recognized, any erroneous information
communicated by the officer had no effect on Green's actions, and in no way
expanded Green's rights under I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), Madden, and Gary. (Tr.,
p.41, L.5 - p.42, L.3.) Green has not explained how his rights were violated by
these communications, or how they expanded his right to communicate with
counsel for the purpose of facilitating an alternative BAC test. Even if the officer
was mistaken about the consequences of Green's refusal to submit to the field
sobriety tests, and did not clearly articulate the nature of the implied consent
statute - Green still refused to submit to the tests.

He was not tricked or

otherwise unlawfully persuaded to submit to the tests.

Further, there is no

indication in the record, or argument from Green, that these communications
unreasonably delayed the DUI investigation process.

Green finally appears to contend that I.C.

3 18-8002(2), which provides

that, "[A DUI suspect] shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before
submitting to such evidentiary testing," provides, by implication, an affirmative
statutory right to consult with counsel, and the reasonable means to do so,
before and after refusing to submit to the state's evidentiary testing. (Appellant's
brief, pp.11-12.) However, the plain language of I.C.

3

18-8002(2) provides no

affirmative rights at all, and actually denies a DUI suspect the right to consult with
an attorney until he submits to the state's evidentiary test. It does not follow, as
Green contends, that "it is only during the time that Idaho Code § 18-8002 is
being applied that [Green] does not have the right to counsel." (Appellant's brief,
p.11.)
Green did not have a right to consult with counsel for the purposes of
arranging alternative testing and gathering evidence until, at the earliest, he
actually took an evidentiary test administered by the state. This Court should
affirm the magistrate's court denial of his motion to suppress.
D.

Green Has Failed To Show That His Due Process Riqhts Were Violated
After The Blood Draw
Green contends that he had a due process right to consult with counsel

"up until the time that he was released from custody," presumably including the
time after the blood draw when he was still in custody. (Appellant's brief, p.1)
The contention, however, is not supported by argument or authority. When
issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or

argument, they will not be considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
923 P.2d 966 (1996).
Further, the record is devoid of evidence that the state denied or materially
interfered with Green's opportunity to contact counsel or make arrangements for
additional testing once Green actually submitted to the blood draw. Sometime
afler the blood draw, but before Green bonded out, Officer Davis, the only
testifying witness at the suppression hearing, had lefl the Blaine County Jail and
was back at his office. (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-18.) Thus, while Green bonded out of
jail at 4:40 am, approximately one hour and ten minutes afler the blood draw, it is
unclear from the record when, or whether, he was given access to a telephone
prior to his release. Finally, the record indicates that Green's lack of cooperation
in the booking process, in refusing to give Officer Davis his address or social
security number, caused some delay between the blood draw and when Green
bonded out. (Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.6.)
Green has thus not adequately argued, and cannot show, that any right to
arrange alternative testing was violated after the blood draw, and thus cannot
show that the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

-

The state respectfully requests this Court to aftirm the magistrate court's
denial of Green's motion to suppress.
DATED this 4th day of January 2010
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